Getting Back on Track: \u3cem\u3eBNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell\u3c/em\u3e Clarifies FELA Jurisdiction and Venue in State Court\u3c/em\u3e by McCarty, Molenda L.
Montana Law Review 
Volume 79 
Issue 1 Winter 2018 Article 7 
4-1-2018 
Getting Back on Track: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell Clarifies FELA 
Jurisdiction and Venue in State Court 
Molenda L. McCarty 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Molenda L. McCarty, Case Note, Getting Back on Track: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell Clarifies FELA 
Jurisdiction and Venue in State Court, 79 Mont. L. Rev. 145 (2018). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 1 22-FEB-18 11:39
NOTE
GETTING BACK ON TRACK: BNSF RAILWAY CO. V.
TYRRELL CLARIFIES FELA JURISDICTION
AND VENUE IN STATE COURT
Molenda L. McCarty*
If the appearance of justice, the integrity of the profession, and public confi-
dence in the judicial system means anything, we should move away from the
view that shopping for juries and laws are “rights.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act2 (“FELA”) holds a railroad
common carrier liable for injuries sustained by employees during their
course of employment.3 Likewise, railroad carriers are liable to an em-
ployee’s personal representative for the death of an employee during the
course and scope of employment.4 Section 56 of FELA establishes that
FELA claims can be brought in the district where: the defendant railroad
resides, the action arose, or the defendant railroad conducts business. It also
establishes that federal jurisdiction shall be concurrent with that of the
* J.D. candidate, 2018, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. I wish
to thank my parents for allowing me to realize my own potential and encouraging me to pursue an
advanced degree. I give special thanks to Professor Anthony Johnstone and the Montana Law Review
editors and staff for their meticulous edits, thoughtful guidance, and contributions to this note.
1. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 305–06 (1996).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2016). The FELA also applies to actions by or on behalf of a seaman
during the course and scope of his employment. Although railroad employers and employees are dis-
cussed herein, for the purposes of this note it is understood that the application of BNSF would not differ
for a maritime employer.
3. Id. § 51.
4. Id. § 51.
1
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States.5 Although the United States Supreme Court had previously ad-
dressed Section 56, it made clear in BNSF Railway Company v. Tyrrell6
(“BNSF”) that Section 56 is a venue statute, and state courts must comport
with the Due Process Clause when asserting jurisdiction over corporations,
including railroads. This note provides historical context of how Montana
asserted jurisdiction over out-of-state railroad defendants and what the
BNSF decision means for future FELA parties. Part II discusses the factual
and procedural background of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in
Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company7 (“Tyrrell”) and the parties’ certiorari
arguments to the United States Supreme Court.8 Part III summarizes the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in BNSF.9 Part IV analyzes how
Montana continued to allow railroad defendants to be haled into the State
when the cause of action was unrelated to Montana, discusses the further
implications of the decision, and notes one critical question left unan-
swered. Section V concludes the note.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Company Factual
& Procedural Background
In 2011, Robert Nelson, a North Dakota resident, sued Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”) in Montana’s Thir-
teenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, to recover damages for
knee injuries he allegedly sustained while employed with BNSF.10 In his
complaint, Nelson did not assert that he had ever worked in Montana or that
his injuries were sustained in Montana.11
In 2014, Kelli Tyrrell (“Tyrrell”), Special Administrator of the Estate
of Brent Tyrrell (“Brent”), also sued BNSF in Yellowstone County after
Brent died from kidney cancer, allegedly due to exposure to various carci-
nogenic chemicals during his employment with BNSF.12 The complaint did
5. Id. § 56.
6. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
7. 373 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2016).
8. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 2016 WL 5462798 at *4 (U.S. Sept. 28,
2016) (No. 16-405) [hereinafter Petition]; Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp’n, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 2016 WL
7011423 at *1 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Opposition].
9. See BNSF, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549.
10. Complaint and Jury Demand, Nelson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2017 WL 816724 at *15–16 (Mont.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 11, 2011) (No. DV-11-0417).
11. See Id. at *16.
12. Complaint and Jury Demand, Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2017 WL 816724 at *20–21 (Mont.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014).
2
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not include a statement that Brent ever worked in Montana or that any
chemical exposure occurred in Montana.13
BNSF is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Texas.14 It operates railroad lines in 28 states and has 6% of its total track
mileage in Montana, employs less than 5% of its total work force in the
state, generates less than 10% of its total revenue in Montana, and main-
tains one of 24 automotive facilities in the state.15
Nelson and Tyrrell both pleaded violations of FELA, and BNSF
moved to dismiss both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction.16 Relying on
Daimler AG v. Bauman,17 Judge Baugh granted BNSF’s motion to dismiss
in Nelson’s case.18 Judge Moses denied BNSF’s motion in Tyrell’s case on
the basis that BNSF was found within Montana and “ha[d] substantial, con-
tinuous and systematic activities within Montana for general jurisdiction
purposes.”19 BNSF appealed Judge Moses’s order, and Nelson appealed
Judge Baugh’s order.20
B. Lower Court Majority Holding
In an opinion authored by Justice Shea, the majority held that Montana
courts have general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under both the FELA
and Montana law.21 The order granting BNSF’s motion to dismiss was re-
versed, the order denying BNSF’s motion to dismiss was affirmed, and both
cases were remanded for further proceedings.22
1. Federal Employers’ Liability Act
The majority based its holding on the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of 45 U.S.C. § 56.23 The majority understood the interpreta-
tion to allow state courts to hear FELA cases, even when the only basis for
13. See Id. at *19–22.
14. Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2016).
15. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017).
16. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3.
17. 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014) (holding that a state may only assert general
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations where “their affiliations with the [forum] [s]tate are so ‘con-
tinuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” there (quoting Goodyear v. Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S 915, 919 (2011)). The “paradigm” forums where a corporation is
“at home” are its place of incorporation and principal place of business. Id.
18. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 3.
19. Id. at 3; see M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (2015) (Montana’s long-arm statute).
20. Opening Brief of BNSF Railway Co., Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Co., *1–2 (Mont. Apr. 15,
2015) (No. DA 14-0825, DA 14-0826).
21. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 9.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4–5; see also 45 U.S.C. § 56 (A FELA “action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in
3
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general jurisdiction is the railroad conducting business in the forum state.24
The Montana Supreme Court rejected BNSF’s contention that Daimler su-
perseded the Supreme Court’s previous interpretations of Section 56.25 The
majority held that “Daimler did not present novel law.” Rather, Daimler
merely reinforced Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, in
which the Supreme Court held that general jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations requires affiliations so “continuous and systematic” as to render the
corporation “at home” in the forum state.26 Moreover, the majority con-
cluded that Congress drafted FELA to render a railroad “at home” for juris-
diction purposes wherever it is “doing business.”27 Because BNSF undis-
putedly was “doing business” within Montana, the majority concluded that
FELA confers general personal jurisdiction to Montana state courts.28
2. Montana Law
Montana applies a two-prong test to decide whether it may assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-resident.29 Jurisdiction must be consistent with
Montana’s long-arm statute,30 and the exercise of personal jurisdiction must
comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States.31 The majority held jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm
statute because BNSF is “found within the state of Montana” when it con-
ducts business, owns real estate, maintains facilities, has a telephone listing,
and directly advertises in Montana.32 The majority transitioned to the con-
stitutionality prong by emphasizing that Montana has previously held that
“[t]he District Courts of Montana clearly have jurisdiction” to hear FELA
which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States . . . shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.”).
24. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 4–5; see, e.g., Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 (1953)
(holding that a plaintiff has the right to sue where the railroad is doing business and that the state forum
where the injury occurred is without the power to enjoin prosecution of the suit in the state where the
railroad is doing business); Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942) (holding that the FELA
prevents a state court from enjoining, on the ground of the inconvenience to the railroad, a resident
citizen of the state from furthering an action in a state court of another state which has jurisdiction under
the FELA).
25. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014)
(holding that “a court may assert [general] jurisdiction over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all
claims against [it]’ only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so
constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
26. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 6 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S at 919 (2011)).
27. Id. at 6 (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49–50 (1941)).
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.; see Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1).
31. Tyrell, 373 P.3d at 8.
32. Id. at 8; see Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (“All persons found within the state of Montana are
subject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts.”).
4
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cases.33 Further, the Court held the constitutionality of Montana’s personal
jurisdiction over BNSF comported with the Montana Constitution’s provi-
sion that “‘courts of justice shall be open to every person . . . .’”34 There-
fore, the majority held that Montana has general personal jurisdiction over
BNSF under both Montana’s long-arm statute and the Due Process
Clause.35
C. Lower Court Dissent
Justice McKinnon authored the dissent, stating that Montana district
courts lack general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the Due Process
Clause.36 The dissent emphasized that the United States Supreme Court has
made “clear” that state courts may only assert general personal jurisdiction
when foreign corporations are “essentially at home” in the forum state.37
The United States Supreme Court instructed that a corporation is “essen-
tially at home” where it is incorporated or has its principal place of busi-
ness.38 Because BNSF is neither incorporated under the laws of Montana
nor has its principal place of business in Montana, Justice McKinnon con-
tended that there is “no dispute” that BNSF is not “at home” in Montana.39
She concluded that BNSF’s contacts are inadequate to satisfy the due pro-
cess standards set forth by the Supreme Court.40
D. Petition for Certiorari
On January 13, 2017, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari “to resolve whether [FELA] §56 authorizes state courts to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over railroads doing business in their States but not incor-
porated or headquartered there, and whether the Montana courts’ exercise
of personal jurisdiction in these cases comports with due process.”41 The
following sections summarize the arguments of the parties, providing con-
text for the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari.
33. Tyrrell, 373 P.3d at 8 (quoting Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Mont. 1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 9 (quoting MONT. CONST. art II, § 16).
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 9 (McKinnon, L. dissenting).
37. Id. at 9 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
38. Tyrell, 373 P.3d at 10 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 761).
39. Id. at 10 (Mont. 2016) (McKinnon, L. dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 11.
41. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555 (2017).
5
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1. BNSF’s Argument
BNSF argued that the Montana Supreme Court erred in asserting juris-
diction over BNSF because the United States Constitution places limitations
on when state courts can assert personal jurisdiction.42 Overall, BNSF
maintained that the United States Supreme Court had previously held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “‘sets the outer
boundary of a state tribunal’s authority’” to assert personal jurisdiction over
a defendant.43 BNSF urged certiorari was necessary to address Montana’s
refusal to apply the Daimler test to the FELA cases at issue and to resolve
the split on whether FELA confers general personal jurisdiction on state
courts.44 Finally, BNSF contended that certiorari was appropriate because
the case involved “extremely important due process protections.”45
a. Eleven Federal Circuits or State Courts Have Refused to Limit
Daimler
BNSF asserted that the Montana Supreme Court created an 11-1 split
as to whether Daimler applies to “purely domestic cases.”46 Both the Sec-
ond Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly rejected attempts to
distinguish the application of Daimler on the ground that it was based on a
transnational case.47 Three other federal circuits have unquestioningly re-
fused Montana’s decision by applying Daimler in “purely domestic”
cases.48 Finally, BNSF identified at least six state courts that applied
Daimler in “cases involving domestic parties and events.”49 As a result,
BNSF argued that certiorari was appropriate in this case to avoid confusion
as to whether Daimler should be applicable over “purely domestic cases.”50
42. Petition, supra note 8, at *4. R
43. Id. at *4 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011)).
44. Id. at *11, *16.
45. Id. at *23.
46. Id. at *11.
47. Id. at *11–12 (citing Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629–30 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that Daimler “made explicit reference to ‘sister-state’ corporations and drew no distinction in
its reasoning between those and foreign-county corporations.”); Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 379 P.3d
1033, 1038 (Colo. 2016) (holding that “[w]hether a nonresident corporate defendant is a resident of
another country or another state is irrelevant to the general jurisdiction inquiry.”)).
48. Petition, supra note 8, at *12 (citing Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis., Inc., 783 F.3d 695, 698 R
(7th Cir. 2015); First Metro. Church of Hous. v. Genesis Grp., 616 F. App’x 148, 149 (5th Cir. 2015);
Jones v. ITT Sys. Div., 595 F. App’x 662 (8th Cir. 2015)).
49. Id. at *13 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 883 (Cal. 2016);
ClearOne, Inc. v. Revolabs, Inc., 369 P.3d 1269, 1282–83 (Utah 2016); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepac, 137
A.3d 123, 127–38 (Del. 2016); Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, Inc. v. John Doe, 349 P.3d 518, 519–20
(Nev. 2015); First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 489 S.W.3d 369, 386–87 (Tenn. 2015);
Sioux Pharm., Inc. v. Summit Nutritionals Int’l Inc., 859 N.W.2d 182, 194–95 (Iowa 2015)).
50. Id. at *13.
6
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b. The Opinion Heightened the Split on Personal Jurisdiction in
FELA Cases
BNSF argued that authority was split regarding personal jurisdiction in
FELA cases, emphasizing three different states that disagreed with Mon-
tana.51 The Mississippi Supreme Court “explicitly rejected” the notion that
the FELA provides a basis for personal jurisdiction without a due process
analysis.52 Following the same reasoning, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held that personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted in FELA
cases until the Due Process standard under International Shoe Company v.
Washington53 is applied and the additional limitations of Section 56 are
applied.54 Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the contention
that a state court can assert personal jurisdiction based on FELA when it
applied International Shoe and concluded that the railroad’s business within
the state did not satisfy the due-process test.55 Thus, BNSF argued that the
holdings in these three states represented the majority in the split of author-
ity, and the United States Supreme Court needed to resolve this personal
jurisdiction split in FELA cases on certiorari.56
c. This Case Involves Exceptionally Important Due Process Issues
BNSF argued that if the United States Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari, every domestic corporation—railroads in particular—doing busi-
ness within Montana would be haled into Montana state courts.57 Moreover,
BNSF argued that Montana’s removal of railroads from the due process
analysis would allow courts to similarly exclude any statutory cause of ac-
tion from the due process analysis.58 BNSF further contended that Montana
has “repeatedly subjected railroad defendants to plaintiff-friendly procedu-
ral rules and substantive FELA standards.”59 BNSF provided the example
that Montana has explicitly disagreed with the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits by extending the statute of limitations for
51. Id. at *17–18 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 362–63 (Miss. 1992)).
52. Id. at *17 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 362–63 (Miss. 1992)).
53. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that “due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
54. Petition, supra note 8, at *17 (citing Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Maynard, 427 S.E.2d 277, 280–81 R
(W.Va. 1993)).
55. Id. at *17–18 (citing Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. 1955)).
56. Id. at *17–18.
57. Id. at *23.
58. Id. at *24.
59. Id. at *24.
7
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FELA claims “longer than any other court.”60 BNSF concluded its argu-
ment, asserting that “[t]he Montana Supreme Court must not be allowed to
ignore [the United States Supreme Court’s] decisions and deny due process
to out-of-state defendants in Montana’s courts.”61
2. Nelson and Tyrrell’s Argument
Nelson and Tyrrell (“Respondents”) argued that the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be denied for three reasons. First, no cases cited by
BNSF, including Daimler, addressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment
limits Congress’s power to establish where defendants can be sued for a
federal claim.62 Second, although BNSF asserted a split in authority, the
cited cases failed to show such conflict.63 Third, the Montana Supreme
Court’s decision was correct because “Congress has broad power to permit
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over U.S.-based defendants for
the adjudication of federal claims.”64
a. Congress Has the Power to Confer Personal Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Respondents contended that Daimler was not at
issue because “the Montana Supreme Court did not hold that Montana state
courts could exercise general jurisdiction, as that term is used in [the United
States Supreme Court’s] case law, over BNSF.”65 Instead, Respondents ar-
gued, “the question at issue was whether BNSF was ‘subject to suit under
the FELA by way of “doing business” in Montana,’” and whether Congress
may authorize states to exercise personal jurisdiction over domestic defend-
ants for federal claims.66 Respondents contended that none of the cases
cited by BNSF held that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded Congress
from allowing state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over domestic cor-
porations to adjudicate federal claims.67
60. Petition, supra note 8, at *24 (citing Anderson v. BNSF Ry. Co, 354 P.3d 1248, 1259–61 R
(Mont. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 1495 (2016)).
61. Id. at *26.
62. Opposition, supra note 8, at *1 (emphasis in original). R
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at *9, *10 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
67. Id. at *12.
8
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b. No Split of Authority
Respondents claimed that each case BNSF contended was inconsistent
with Tyrrell, was “easily reconcilable.”68 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that the state’s long-arm statute did not permit the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state FELA defendant doing business within
Mississippi. 69 Respondents argued that Mississippi’s holding denying juris-
diction was “‘wholly independent of constitutional due process concerns
. . . flowing from International Shoe’ and its progeny,” and as such, did not
address whether Mississippi “could” constitutionally subject the railroad to
personal jurisdiction.70
Next, Respondents addressed Hayman v. Southern Pacific Company,
another FELA case holding that jurisdiction could not be asserted over an
out-of-state defendant. Respondents distinguished this case from the case at
hand by asserting the Missouri Court interpreted the state long-arm statute
and not federal law.71 Finally, Respondents argued that Norfolk Southern
Railway Company v. Maynard, was “even further afield” than the other two
cases BNSF relied upon.72 In that case, the railroad’s subsidiary had insuffi-
cient activity to find that Norfolk Southern Railway Co. was doing business
in the state.73 The Norfolk Court cited International Shoe in dicta to de-
scribe the scope of the long-arm statute and distinguish between a suit
under the long-arm statute and one under the FELA “doing business” stan-
dard.74 Respondents thus disagreed with BNSF’s contention that an author-
ity split existed as to whether FELA authorizes state courts to assert juris-
diction in claims unrelated to the state.
c. Montana’s Decision is Correct
Finally, Respondents argued that the United States Supreme Court had
reviewed FELA cases involving out-of-state plaintiffs, defendants, and
events, but had not questioned the personal jurisdiction issue.75 Further, the
Court has continuously held that the inconvenience and cost to FELA de-
fendants in any state where they are doing business was “contemplated by
68. Opposition, supra note 8, at *13–15; see also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So.2d 357 R
(Miss. 1992); Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1955); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. May-
nard, 437 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1993).
69. Fox, 609 So.2d at 362–63.
70. Opposition, supra note 8, at *13 (emphasis in original) (citing Fox, 609 So. 2d at 359, 361). R
71. Id. at *14.
72. Id. at *14.
73. Id. at *14.
74. Id. at *14–15.
75. Id. at *15–16.
9
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Congress and is permissible.”76 Although the cases the Court previously
decided did not involve personal jurisdiction, Respondents argued that this
case was consistent with the underlying liberal interpretation of FELA in
favor of injured plaintiffs.77 Thus, Respondents concluded that Montana’s
decision was consistent with past United States Supreme Court decisions.78
Respondents disagreed with BNSF’s argument that plaintiffs would
flood state courts with FELA claims against defendants with no connection
to the state other than doing business there.79 Respondents contended that
the Montana Supreme Court did not allow state courts to adjudicate every
claim against railroads based on the doing business standard.80 Rather, it
held that courts may adjudicate FELA claims like the case at hand only
when state law permits the jurisdiction.81 Further, Respondents addressed
BNSF’s claim of unfairness by concluding that Congress had considered
narrowing plaintiffs’ forum choices, but instead gave plaintiffs broad dis-
cretion to choose where to bring their claims.82
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
On May 30, 2017, an 8-1 opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg, re-
versed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Tyrrell, and the cases
were remanded for further proceedings.83 The United States Supreme Court
held that the first sentence of 45 U.S.C. § 56 (“Section 56”) does not ad-
dress personal jurisdiction over railroads; rather, it is a venue statute gov-
erning proper locations for FELA suits filed in federal courts.84 Addition-
ally, the second sentence of Section 56 refers to subject-matter jurisdiction,
confirming that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over FELA
cases.85 Finally, Montana’s reliance on its long-arm jurisdiction does not
comport with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
when the defendant is not “at home” within the state and the underlying
issue did not occur in another state.86
76. Opposition, supra note 8, at *16. R
77. Id. at *16–17.
78. Id. at *17–18.
79. Id. at *20.
80. Id. at *20.
81. Id. at *20.
82. Opposition, supra note 8, at *20–21. R
83. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017).
84. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1553.
85. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1553.
86. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1553 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134, ___ S. Ct.
746, 760 (2014)).
10
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A. First Sentence of Section 56 Does Not Refer to Personal Jurisdiction
The first sentence of Section 56 states in part that “an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States . . . in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.”87 Gener-
ally, the United States Supreme Court explained, Congress uses the expres-
sion “‘may be brought’” to describe proper venue for an action.88 In Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad Company v. Kepner, the Supreme Court interpreted
Section 56 as “establish[ing] venue” for a federal court action.89 Contrary to
Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the cases analyzing Section 56,
neither Kepner nor any other decision suggests that Section 56 might affect
personal jurisdiction.90
The Court contrasted venue statutes from personal jurisdiction statutes,
pointing out that venue statutes generally use the language, “where suit
‘may be brought,’”91 and personal jurisdiction statutes are Congress’s
method of allowing for service of process.92 Despite Respondents’ conten-
tion that the 1888 Judiciary Act provision that “prompted [Section] 56’s
enactment” concerned both personal jurisdiction and venue, the Court has
long interpreted Section 56 to concern only venue.93 The Court did concede
that if the provision had been read as a personal jurisdiction statute, it
would have “yielded an anomalous result: In diversity cases, the provision
allowed for suit ‘in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant.’”94 The United States Supreme Court noted that interpreting this
to be a personal jurisdiction provision would have allowed the plaintiff to
87. 45 U.S. § 56. This is the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 56 but is referred to
as the “first sentence” by the Court.
88. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2017) (gen-
eral venue statute specifying where “[a] civil action may be brought”)).
89. 314 U.S. 44, 52 (1941).
90. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, 314 U.S. 44, 52 (1941)).
91. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (general venue statute specifying
where “[a] civil action may be brought”)); J. Oakley, ALI, Fed. Judicial Code Rev. Project 253–290
(2004) (listing special venue statutes, many with similar language); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 56 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The phrasing of [Section 56] follows
the familiar pattern generally employed by Congress in framing venue provisions.”).
92. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–56; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22 (Clayton Act
provision stating that “all process in [cases against a corporation arising under federal antitrust laws]
may be served in the district of which [the defendant] is an inhabitant, or wherever [the defendant] may
be found”); see also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1987)
(discussing statutes that authorize (or fail to authorize) nationwide service of process). But cf. Schlanger
v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971) (though “Congress has provided for nationwide service of
process” in 28 U.S.C. 1391(e) (1964 ed., Supp. V), that statute was meant to expand venue, not personal
jurisdiction).
93. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1556.
94. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1556.
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hale the defendant into her home district, even if the defendant or action
had no connection to that district.95 However, the Court clarified that the
first sentence of Section 56 refers to venue and not jurisdiction.96
B. Second Sentence of Section 56 Grants Concurrent Jurisdiction
to the States
The second sentence of Section 56 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of
the courts of the several States.”97 Respondents claimed this sentence ex-
tended their argument of personal jurisdiction to the state courts.98 How-
ever, as the United States Supreme Court held, the first sentence of Section
56 does not confer personal jurisdiction in any court and only concerns
federal court venue.99
The United States Supreme Court has continuously interpreted Section
56’s second sentence to provide for concurrent subject-matter jurisdictions
over FELA actions.100 The opinion notes that Respondents acknowledged
in their brief that Congress added the provision to confirm subject-matter
jurisdiction after the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Congress had
intended to confine FELA litigation to federal courts.101 The United States
Supreme Court, quoting Justice McKinnon’s dissent from the Montana Su-
preme Court’s decision, stated “[t]he phrase ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ is a
well-known term of art long employed by Congress and courts to refer to
subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction.”102 In Mims v. Arrow
Financial Services, LLC,103 the Court held that federal and state courts have
“concurrent jurisdiction” over suits arising under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991. Additionally, in Clafin v. Houseman,104 the Court
held that state courts retain “concurrent jurisdiction” over “suits in which a
bankrupt” party is involved, notwithstanding federal court’s exclusive juris-
diction over bankruptcy matters. Therefore, in order for Montana to retain
concurrent jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction must have existed.
95. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1556.
96. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–56.
97. 45 U.S.C. § 56.
98. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1556.
99. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1556.
100. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557; see Second Emp’rs Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 55–56 (1912).
101. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557; see Brief for Resp’ts, BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 2017 WL 1192088 at *23 (U.S. March 29, 2017) (No. 16-405).
102. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557 (quoting Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 436 P.3d
1, 13 (Mont. 2016)) (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. 565 U.S. 368, 372 (2012).
104. 93 U.S. 130, 133–34 (1876).
12
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C. The Four Key Cases Cited by Respondents
The United States Supreme Court then analyzed the four cases the
Montana Supreme Court cited to show that the United States Supreme
Court has consistently ‘“interpreted [Section] 56 to allow state courts to
hear cases brought under FELA even where the only basis for jurisdiction is
the railroad doing business in the forum [s]tate.’”105 The four cases the
Montana Supreme Court interpreted to reach this conclusion were: Pope v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad
Company, Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company v. Kepner, and Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company v. Terte.106 The United States Supreme
Court cautioned against the Montana Court’s reliance on cases “decided in
the era dominated” by the “territorial thinking” of Pennoyer v. Neff,107 not-
ing that the only case decided after International Shoe was Pope.108
The United States Supreme Court further noted that none of the deci-
sions Montana relied on “resolved a question of personal jurisdiction.”109 In
Terte, although the FELA plaintiff could bring suit in a Missouri state court
after being injured in Colorado, and the railroad was incorporated in Dela-
ware, the overall dispute hinged on the Dormant Commerce Clause and not
personal jurisdiction.110 In both Kepner and Miles, the United States Su-
preme Court held that state courts may not enjoin their residents from
bringing a FELA suit in another state’s federal or state courts based on
inconvenience to the railroad defendant.111 Finally, the Pope Court held that
the statutory “provision for transfer from one federal court to another did
not bear on the question decided in Miles: A state court still could not en-
join a FELA action brought in another state’s courts.”112 Therefore, the
Court distinguished all four of the key cases relied on by the Montana Su-
105. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557 (quoting Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d
1, 4–5 (2016)).
106. 284 U.S. 284 (1932).
107. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
108. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557–58; see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
___, ___ n. 18, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 (2014) (noting that cases “decided in the era of Pennoyer’s
territorial thinking should not attract heavy reliance today” (internal citation omitted)).
109. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557.
110. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557; see Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284,
286, 287 (1932) (“The alleged residence in Missouri of persons whose testimony plaintiff supposed
would be necessary to prove his claim was not enough to justify retention of jurisdiction by the Circuit
Court. While this circumstance might enable plaintiff to try his cause there with less inconvenience than
elsewhere, it would not prevent imposition of a serious burden upon interstate commerce. And, we have
held, it is the infliction of this burden that deprives the courts of jurisdiction over cases like this.”).
111. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557 (citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 699–700 (1942)).
112. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1557 (citing Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.,
345 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1953)).
13
McCarty: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-FEB-18 11:39
158 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 79
preme court, noting they had not held that Section 56 could be interpreted
as a personal jurisdiction statute.113
D. Montana’s Long-Arm Statute
The United States Supreme Court discussed that the history of Section
56 does not authorize state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
railroad on the basis that it does business in the state.114 Thus, Montana’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with the state’s long-arm
statute.115 Since BNSF did not dispute it was “‘found within’” the State of
Montana, the Court focused on whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
violated BNSF’s Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.116
The International Shoe Court rationalized that a state court may exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who have “certain
minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”117
Following International Shoe, the Court distinguished between specific ju-
risdiction118 and general jurisdiction.119 Because there was no allegation
that either Respondent’s underlying incident occurred in Montana, specific
jurisdiction was not at issue.120
In Daimler, the Court simplified its prior holding that “a court may
assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all claims
against [it]’ only when the corporation’s affiliations with the [s]tate in
which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essen-
tially at home in the forum [s]tate.”121 The Court explained that the “para-
digm” forums include the corporation’s place of incorporation and its prin-
cipal place of business.122 Although the paradigm forums are not the limita-
tion of personal jurisdiction, a corporate defendant’s operations may only
113. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–58.
114. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–58.
115. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–58; see M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (“All persons found within the state
of Montana are subject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts.”).
116. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)).
117. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
118. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (“Where a forum seeks to
assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this ‘fair
warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at the residents of
the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities”
(internal citations omitted).).
119. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (“For an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as home.”).
120. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017).
121. Damiler AG. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919).
122. Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
14
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“be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home
in that state” in an “exceptional case.”123
Although Montana had distinguished Daimler on the ground that it did
not include a FELA claim or a railroad defendant,124 the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process constraint in Daimler applies to all
state-court assertions of general jurisdiction regardless of the type of claim
or corporate defendant.125 The Court reiterated that BNSF is not incorpo-
rated in Montana and does not maintain its principal place of business in
Montana. Further, BNSF does not heavily engage in business activities in
Montana so “as to render [it] essentially at home” there.126 The Court con-
cluded that even though BNSF has over 2,000 miles of railroad track and
more than 2,000 employees in Montana, Daimler observed that “‘the gen-
eral jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the de-
fendant’s in-state contacts.’”127 The Court held that BNSF can “‘scarcely
be deemed at home’” in all of the states that it operates, and the in-state
business does not permit general jurisdiction over claims such as Respon-
dents’ that are unrelated to any activity in Montana.128 Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s deci-
sion and remanded the matters for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.129
E. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the conclusion that Section 56 does
not confer personal jurisdiction over railroads in state courts.130 She further
agreed that the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding that the nature of
the claim comports with the Due Process Clause to allow personal jurisdic-
tion over BNSF.131 Despite her concurrence in the result, Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent focused on her continued disagreement “with the path
the Court struck with Daimler . . . which limits general jurisdiction over a
123. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1558; see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952) (held as the “textbook” exceptional case of general jurisdiction on the
basis that the foreign defendant maintained an office in Ohio, kept corporate files there, and oversaw the
company’s activities from Ohio during a time of war).
124. Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 6 (Mont. 2016).
125. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1558–59.
126. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.
127. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Daimler AG., 571 U.S. at ___ n. 20, 135 S. Ct. at 762 n.
20).
128. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Daimler AG., 571 U.S. at ___ n. 20, 135 S. Ct. at 762 n.
20).
129. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.
130. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
131. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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corporate defendant only to those States where it is ‘essentially at
home.’”132
Justice Sotomayor opined that the United States Supreme Court would
do well to adhere to its decision in International Shoe, where it held that the
question is whether the benefits the corporation attained in the state “war-
ranted the burdens associated with general jurisdiction.”133 The dissent sug-
gested that the approach from Daimler creates a “jurisdictional windfall”
for corporations that operate across a number of jurisdictions.134 As a result,
it is “virtually inconceivable” that these large corporations will ever be
haled into court in a state other than their principal place of business or
incorporation.135 Therefore, it is the plaintiffs who will “bear the brunt of
the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with
which they have no contacts or connection.”136
Moreover, Justice Sotomayor predominantly disagrees with the major-
ity’s decision not to treat the case at hand as a possible “exceptional
case.”137 The majority did not remand the case to Montana, where the due
process question could be analyzed under the proper legal question; in Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s opinion, this created a situation where the only “excep-
tional case” would have to have facts on point with Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company.138
IV. ANALYSIS: THE TRACK TO RAILROAD PLAINTIFFS’ FORUM SHOPPING
A. History of FELA
FELA enables railroad employees to recover damages for injuries re-
sulting from a railroad equipment deficiency or from the negligence of the
agents or employees of the railroad.139 Although it seems anomalous today
that only railroad workers have a federal remedy for workplace injuries
rather than a state workers’ compensation remedy,140 the roots of FELA
stem from the unique role of the American railroad employee. In the late
nineteenth century, “the average life expectancy of a switchman was seven
years, and a brakeman’s chance of dying from natural causes was less than
132. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 761).
133. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
317–18 (1945)).
134. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1560.
135. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1560.
136. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1561.
137. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561–62 (2017).
138. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. 1561–62; see 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
139. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
140. See id. §§ 51–60.
16
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one in five.”141 In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt urged Congress to
pass FELA: “‘The practice of putting the entire burden of loss to life and
limb upon the victim or the victim’s family is a form of social injustice in
which the United States stands in unenviable prominence.’”142 In response
to the dangers of railroad working conditions, and perhaps President
Roosevelt’s advocacy, Congress first enacted FELA in 1908.143
Prior to FELA, injured railroad workers found legal recourse difficult
due to common-law tort principles.144 FELA served public policy objec-
tives of doing away with the fellow-servant rule, the doctrine of assumption
of risk, and the principle of contributory negligence as a complete de-
fense.145 Enacted in New York in 1910, the first workers’ compensation
law was almost immediately struck down as unconstitutional.146 Since
workers’ compensation was not a viable legislative option in the early twen-
tieth century, FELA was revolutionary and ensured compensation for in-
jured railroad workers.147
The courts have liberally construed the FELA “to further Congress’[s]
remedial goal.”148 Federal and state courts are protective of “broad venue
rights” for FELA plaintiffs.149 Since general federal venue statutes “worked
injustices to employees,” FELA plaintiffs are allowed a broader venue
choice than those granted under general venue statutes.150 Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff’s right to select a
venue granted under Section 56 is a “substantial right.”151 Although FELA
is liberally construed, the Court noted that it is not an “attempt by Congress
to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect
their modes of procedure.”152
B. History and Policy of Forum Shopping
Forum shopping “occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried
in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most
favorable judgment or verdict.”153 The modern American judicial system
141. Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908,
29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 81 (1992).
142. 45 Cong. Rec. 4041 (1910).
143. Railroad Employers’ Liability, Pub. L. No. 60–100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908).
144. Baker, supra note 141, at 82. R
145. Id. at 82.
146. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 319 (N.Y. 1911).
147. Baker, supra note 141, at 82–83. R
148. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Carlisle, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994).
149. Rule v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 106 P.3d 533, 536 (Mont. 2005).
150. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 53 (1941).
151. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949).
152. Second Emp’rs Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56 (1912).
153. Norwood, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 655 (6th ed. 1990). R
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did not create forum shopping. In the Later Roman Empire and into the
Byzantine period, a plaintiff did not have the right to choose his jurisdiction
but often found ways to effectively bypass the rules to select a forum of his
choice.154 During the Later Roman Empire, one of the most basic of tactics
used by plaintiffs seeking a venue change was the manner in which a plain-
tiff shaped his claim.155 For example, the Theodosian Code 2.1.8, from 395
A.D., refers to plaintiffs who deliberately framed suits “under the guise of
criminal action” to allow a certain Imperial magistrate to hear cases.156 In
the modern judicial system, selection of venue, personal jurisdiction, and
general jurisdiction are all different vehicles for forum shopping. This sec-
tion focuses primarily on venue-driven forum shopping since the United
States Supreme Court labeled Section 56 as a venue statute rather than a
personal jurisdiction statute.
Venue statutes by their nature create an opportunity for a plaintiff to
forum shop by providing numerous courts in which venue is proper.157 The
Court is unclear whether the purpose of venue statutes is to provide choice
of forum for the plaintiff or to “further judicial management by protecting
against unreasonable venue choices.”158 The 1941 decision in Kepner pro-
vided a prime example of the plaintiff’s-choice approach to venue. In Kep-
ner, the plaintiff selected a forum with no relation to the events that gave
rise to his claim.159 Possibly, the plaintiff chose this forum because the jury
would likely award  higher damages.160 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the plaintiff’s choice of venue because “venue is a privilege created
by federal statute,” and that privilege “cannot be frustrated for reasons of
convenience or expense.”161 Notably, Justice Frankfurter questions in his
dissent whether the venue statute at issue was “intended to give a plaintiff
an absolute and unqualified right to compel trial of his action in any of the
specified places he chooses.”162
Leroy v. Great Western United Corporation163 serves as a leading case
establishing the judicial-management principal of venue statutes. The Su-
preme Court noted that, “[i]n most instances, the purpose of statutorily
specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff
will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.”164 The Leroy Court held
154. CAROLINE HUMFRESS, RULERS & ELITES, LAW AND EMPIRE 234–35 (2013).
155. Id. at 235.
156. Id. at 235–36 (internal citation omitted).
157. Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 170 (2000).
158. Id. at 171.
159. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 48 (1941); Ryan, supra note 157, at 171. R
160. Ryan, supra note 157, at 171. R
161. Kepner, 314 U.S. at 53–54.
162. Id. at 57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
163. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
164. Id. at 183–84 (emphasis in original).
18
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that the current venue statute that made venue proper in “‘the judicial dis-
trict . . . in which the claim arose,’” should be narrowly construed so only
in “unusual case[s]” could the claim arise in more than one judicial dis-
trict.165 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court based its decision on
the foundation that “Congress did not intend . . . to give [plaintiffs] an
unfettered choice among a host of different districts.”166 The Leroy decision
furthered the judicial-management policy by limiting proper venues to
where the claim arose, the defendant’s residence, or, in the case of corpora-
tions, where the corporation was rendered “at home.”167
C. Montana’s Continuous Pro-Plaintiff Choice Holdings
Plaintiffs bringing FELA claims in Montana against railroads that
merely did business in the state when the underlying action has no relation
to the state is not a novel issue. Many of these earlier cases did not chal-
lenge jurisdiction on the same basis as Tyrrell because Goodyear and
Daimler had not been decided. At first, the railroads often claimed improper
jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens.168 The rule of forum non con-
veniens is rooted in equity and allows the court discretion to decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a case when it believes the case may be more
“appropriately and justly” tried elsewhere.169 Ultimately, the court would
rule in favor of the injured railroad employees, leaving the railroads to raise
other arguments.170
In the late 1950s, Nathaniel H. Bracy, a resident of Washington, sued
Great Northern Railway Company, a Minnesota corporation, in Silver Bow
County, Montana for injuries he sustained while working in a railroad yard
in Washington.171 Great Northern filed a motion to dismiss based on forum
non conveniens twice before trial and once at the close of the case—all
motions were denied.172 The Montana Supreme Court held that the district
court had not abused its discretion and denied the motions based on forum
non conveniens.173 Because the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
165. Id. at 184–85 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (amended in 1990 to remove the language “in
which the claim arose”)).
166. Id. at 185.
167. Id. at 185; see also Damiler AG. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014);
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017); Ryan, supra note 157, at R
172.
168. See, e.g., Bracy v. Great N. Ry. Co., 343 P.2d 848, 849–50 (Mont. 1959).
169. Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Mont. 1979) (quoting Leet v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 155 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1944).
170. See, e.g., Bracy, 343 P.2d at 850; Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co. v. District Court, 365 P.2d
512, 514 (Mont. 1961); Labella, 595 P.2d at 1187.
171. Bracy, 343 P.2d at 850.
172. Id. at 849–50.
173. Id. at 850.
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trict court, plaintiffs not related to Montana would continue to bring cases
against the railroad in Montana.174
In 1961, a Washington resident again haled Great Northern Railway
Company into Silver Bow County, Montana under a FELA claim for an
alleged injury that occurred in Spokane, Washington while the plaintiff
worked for Great Northern.175 The railroad filed an original proceeding for
an appropriate writ, contending that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in denying the railroad’s motion to dismiss based on the ground of
forum non conveniens.176 The Montana Supreme Court did not feel com-
pelled to establish the rule as it related to FELA claims, because there did
not appear to be a trend of these types of cases—only eighteen were filed in
the previous eleven years.177 Therefore, the Court did not adopt a rule at
that time, but warned that if a “substantial increase” in this type of litigation
occurred, it would “reexamine the situation.”178
With the Montana Supreme Court yet to address the relationship be-
tween forum non conveniens and FELA claims, plaintiffs continued to sue
railroads in Montana when the underlying incident had no relation to the
State. In 1979, Michael A. Labella, Jr., a resident of Washington sued Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, in Lewis and Clark
County, Montana for injuries he sustained while working at one of Burling-
ton’s rail yards in Washington.179 Burlington moved to dismiss on the
ground of forum non conveniens.180 The district court dismissed Labella’s
case. For the first time, the Montana Supreme Court stated it was “squarely
faced” with the issue of the relationship between forum non conveniens and
FELA.181 The Court found the policy of liberally construing FELA to favor
injured railroad workers to be “highly persuasive” and rejected forum non
conveniens in FELA actions.182 The Court again gave the warning: “‘[I]f a
substantial increase in this type of litigation is called to our attention in the
future we will reexamine the situation in light of what we have herein
stated.’”183 To date, the Court has not reversed its position on forum non
conveniens in FELA actions. However, this type of litigation continued,
174. See, e.g., Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co., 365 P.2d at 512; Labella, 595 P.2d at 1184.
175. Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co., 365 P.2d at 512.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 514.
178. Id. at 514. Specific statistics of cases against railroads in Montana of this sort from 1961 to date
are unavailable. As such, within the scope of this note, whether a “trend” actually occurred in Montana
cannot be assessed.
179. Labella, 595 P.2d at 1185.
180. Id. at 1185.
181. Id. at 1185.
182. Id. at 1187.
183. Id. at 1187 (quoting Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co. v. District Court, 365 P.2d 512, 514
(Mont. 1961)).
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ultimately resulting in the current BNSF decision by the United States Su-
preme Court.184
Although BNSF focused on a split of authority regarding personal ju-
risdiction as applied to a FELA cause of action, Montana has taken their
pro-FELA plaintiff stance further than other states. Including the decision in
Anderson v. BNSF Railway,185 which BNSF argued extended the statute of
limitations for FELA plaintiffs in Montana longer than any other court,186
Montana has a long history of broadly construing FELA in favor of plain-
tiffs.187 As seen in Bracy, Great Northern, and Labella, Montana disagreed
with the railroad defendants, and by 1979 it had created greater opportunity
for railroad plaintiffs to forum shop by ultimately rejecting forum non con-
veniens arguments in FELA cases.188
In 1995, Montana justified its rejection of forum non conveniens in
FELA cases for four reasons.189 First, courts should construe FELA liber-
ally in favor of injured railroad employees “so that it may accomplish its
humanitarian and remedial purposes.”190 Second, the Court found the pol-
icy of a worker’s choice of forum to be “highly persuasive,” “even if that
choice of forum involves forum shopping.”191 Third, the Montana Constitu-
tion requires its courts to remain open to every person regardless of resi-
dence or citizenship.192 Fourth, United States citizens who are not Montana
citizens are statutorily entitled to the same rights and duties as Montana
citizens.193 Montana also emphasized that it had committed to “the strong
national policy favoring a plaintiff’s selection of forum in actions brought
184. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
185. 354 P.3d 1248, 1262 (Mont. 2015) (holding that Montana is not bound to follow federal circuit
court precedents and the discovery rule applies in FELA cases for statute of limitations purposes).
186. Petition, supra note 8, at *24. R
187. See Bracy v. Great N. Ry. Co., 343 P.2d 848, 850 (Mont. 1959) (holding the district court did
not abuse its discretion thrice denying forum non conveniens arguments); Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry.
Co., 365 P.2d at 514 (holding there was not a trend of cases not related to the state arguing forum non
conveniens and as such, it was not at liberty to articulate a rule); Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d
1184, 1187 (Mont. 1979) (holding that railroad defendants are barred from asserting forum non con-
veniens arguments in FELA cases).
188. See Bracy v. Great N. Ry. Co., 343 P.2d 848, 850 (Mont. 1959) (holding the district court did
not abuse its discretion thrice denying forum non conveniens arguments); Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry.
Co., 365 P.2d at 514 (holding there was not a trend of cases not related to the state arguing forum non
conveniens and as such, it was not at liberty to articulate a rule); Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d
1184, 1187 (Mont. 1979) (holding that railroad defendants are barred from asserting forum non con-
veniens arguments in FELA cases).
189. Montana ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498–99 (Mont. 1995)
190. Id. at 498.
191. Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 499.
193. Id. at 409 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 49–1–204).
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under [FELA].”194 Thus, Montana enforced its intention to continue to lib-
erally construe FELA in favor of plaintiffs, regardless of the forum shop-
ping opportunities it created.
Montana opined that Ford v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company
emphasized the national policy favoring plaintiff’s forum choice in FELA
cases.195 The Ford plaintiffs, residents of Wyoming, claimed they were in-
jured in Wyoming while working for Burlington Northern.196 Plaintiffs
filed the complaint in Yellowstone County, Montana against the railroad
that was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in
Texas.197 The district court denied the railroad’s motion to transfer venue to
Hill County, Montana. Burlington argued, on appeal, Hill County was its
Montana headquarters.198 Relying on Montana’s venue statute, which the
Court had consistently interpreted to allow a foreign corporation to be sued
in any county selected by the plaintiff, the Montana Supreme Court af-
firmed the denial and emphasized its interpretation that plaintiff’s-choice
forum was a “national policy, dating back to 1910” in FELA cases.199 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court affirmed Ford, it held that Mon-
tana’s venue rules could be understood as rationally furthering a legitimate
state interest, but it did not emphasize that plaintiff’s-choice forum in FELA
cases was a strong national policy.200
While it is clear courts should construe FELA statutes liberally in
favor of injured railroad employees,201 it is less clear if a national policy
exists for plaintiff’s-choice of forum for FELA claims. By rejecting the
doctrine in FELA cases,202 but accepting it in other cases,203 Montana is the
only state that questions whether federal forum non conveniens is generally
applicable to all defendants.204 By 2015, thirty-seven states and the District
194. Id. at 409 (citing Ford v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 819 P.2d 169, 175 (Mont. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted); aff’d, Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992).
195. Montana ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 498–99 (Mont. 1995) (citing
Ford, 819 P.2d at 175).
196. Ford, 819 P.2d at 170.
197. Id. at 170.
198. Id. at 170.
199. Id. at 174.
200. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 654 (1992).
201. Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938) (“The [FELA] has been liberally con-
strued ‘so as to give a right of recovery for every injury the proximate cause of which was a failure to
comply with a requirement of the Act.’” (internal citation omitted)).
202. Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1187 (Mont. 1979) (rejecting forum non conveniens in
all FELA cases).
203. The federal common law doctrine has not been outright rejected in Montana and has been
applied in non-FELA instances. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 329 P.3d
1264, 1271–72 (relying on a mandatory contractual forum selection clause to conclude that noncontrac-
tual issues should be dismissed under forum non conveniens).
204. See infra notes 205–08.
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of Columbia had adopted the federal forum non conveniens doctrine or a
similar principle.205 Hawaii, Oregon, and Virginia had not adopted the doc-
trine but expressed willingness to do so in the future.206 One state has yet to
adopt a specific interpretation, six states have adopted limited versions, and
two states restrict the doctrine to a limited scope of cases.207 However, even
the two states that restrict the application of forum non conveniens to a
limited scope of cases do not restrict the application in FELA cases like
Montana.208 Although forum shopping is not limited to forum non con-
veniens, the fact that Montana is the only state to increase plaintiff’s-choice
of forum in FELA cases suggests Montana’s argument of a strong national
policy (on some fronts) may not be accurate.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court opined that defendants
could move for forum non conveniens in FELA suits after Congress revised
Title 28 of the United States Code.209 The current Code provides that, “For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.”210 The reviser’s notes that accompany each sec-
tion of the Code provides:
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though venue is
proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Kepner, which was prosecuted under the [FELA] . . . . The new
subsection requires the courts to determine that the transfer is necessary for
convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest
of justice to do so.211
As such, the drafters of the Code explicitly note that a forum non con-
veniens provision was necessary for FELA claims, which further contra-
205. Brian J. Springer, An Inconvenient Truth: How Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Allows De-
fendants to Escape State Court Jurisdiction, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 843, App. Table 1 (2015) (citing
the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, D.C., Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
206. Id. at 845 n. 55.
207. Id. at 845.
208. See Miller v. American Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 617 (La. 1992) (holding forum non
conveniens arguments are only applicable to federal causes of action and are not applicable under the
Jones Act or federal maritime law); Gonzalez v. Department of Transp., 610 S.E.2d 527, 528–29 (Ga.
2005) (holding that the doctrine is limited to cases in which it is authorized by statute and cases when
nonresident bring suits for injuries occurring outside the United States.)
209. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 57–58 (1949).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a).
211. Id. § 1404 (Prior Law and Revision).
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dicts the national policy asserted by Montana.212 Yet Montana continued to
uphold its pro-plaintiff venue and jurisdiction policies in FELA actions.213
In 1961, the Montana Supreme Court held that Congress established a
“clearly defined rule of action” under Section 56, where it “definitively au-
thorized” plaintiffs to bring actions in Montana, where the railroad was do-
ing business, and where trial court was vested with jurisdiction.214 Noting
that the purpose of the FELA was to shift the burden of the loss resulting
from injuries to the railroads, who can “measurably control their causes,”
the Montana Supreme Court held that according to Section 56, “[t]he Dis-
trict Courts of Montana clearly have jurisdiction.”215 This holding circum-
vented the United States Supreme Court’s holding from 1941, which stated
that Section 56 was a venue statute, not a jurisdiction statute.216
In Kepner, the plaintiff chose to file a FELA claim in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York for injuries that occurred in Ohio, despite the facts that
the chosen forum was seven hundred miles from the plaintiff’s residence
and the presentation of the case would require the transportation of at least
twenty-five witnesses, at a cost estimated to exceed the presentation of the
case.217  The Court stated that there was “no resulting benefit to the injured
employee” from selecting the New York forum,218 but practitioners later
claimed that the forum choice was for a potentially higher damage recov-
ery.219 Because “venue is a privilege created by federal statute” and “cannot
be frustrated for reasons of convenience or expense,” the Court upheld the
plaintiff’s choice.220 The Court explained the basis of its decision was “in
the terms of the venue provision of the [FELA]”, or Section 56.221 Even
though the United States Supreme Court labeled Section 56 as a venue stat-
ute, Montana held that Section 56 “definitely authorized” jurisdiction, creat-
ing a different vehicle of forum shopping not privileged by the federal stat-
212. Id.; contra Montana ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v District Court, 891 P.2d 493, 499 (Mont.
1995) (committing to a “strong national policy” in favor of railroad plaintiffs (citing Ford v. Burlington
N. R.R. Co., 819 P.2d 169, 175 (Mont. 1991)).
213. See, e.g., Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co. v. District Court, 365 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1961).
214. Id. at 521.
215. Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1186, 1186 (Mont. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 52 (1941).
217. Id. at 48.
218. Id. at 48.
219. Ryan, supra note 157, at 171. R
220. Kepner, 314 U.S. at 52, 54.
221. Id. at 56 (emphasis added) (comparing the phrasing of the section to other venue provisions,
see, e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 112 (suits based upon diversity of citizenship); 28 U.S.C. § 53 (suits by or against
Chine Trade Act corporations); 28 U.S.C. § 104 (suits for penalties and forfeitures); 28 U.S.C. § 105
(suits for recovery of taxes); 28 U.S.C. § 41(26)(b) (interpleader)).
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ute.222 This interpretation prevailed in Montana until 2017, when the United
States Supreme Court explicitly stated in BNSF that the first sentence of
Section 56 provided for venue privileges and not jurisdiction for purposes
of the FELA.223
Without forum non conveniens, railroad defendants did not have a
clear argument for lack of personal jurisdiction until the 2011 Goodyear
decision and the narrower 2014 Daimler decision.224 It is unclear how many
causes of action unrelated to the state were brought in Montana between
1961 and 2017; however, Montana did not consider the eighteen cases
brought between 1950 and 1961 a “trend.”225 Yet plaintiffs’ tendency to
bring FELA cases unrelated to Montana continued, and Montana en-
couraged forum shopping when it advanced the plaintiff’s-choice policy.226
Ultimately, it was not only railroad defendants that took note of Montana’s
assertion of jurisdiction in FELA cases, and another state refused to follow
suit.227
In Oregon, Christopher S. Barrett filed a FELA claim against Union
Pacific Railroad Company after he allegedly sustained injuries in Idaho
while working as a spike machine operator.228 Union Pacific is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska.229 At the time,
Union Pacific operated in 23 states including Oregon, in which it owned
3.4% of its tracks.230 Barrett contended he could bring the cause of action in
Oregon because Section 56 provided for general jurisdiction in that state.
Further, he argued, Oregon had general jurisdiction because Union Pacific’s
actions in the state were “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
222. Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co. v. District Court, 365 P.2d 512, 521 (Mont. 1961); see
Labella v. Burlington N., 595 P.2d 1184, 1185–86 (Mont. 1979) (under Section 56 “District Courts of
Montana clearly have jurisdiction”).
223. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1549, 1555 (2017) (“Section 56’s
first relevant sentence concerns venue . . . .”).
224. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and
all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to
render them essentially at home in the forum state.” (internal citation omitted)); Daimler AG. v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (“[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether
a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it
is whether the corporation’s ‘affiliations with the state are so “continuous and systematic” as to render
[it] essentially at home in the forum state.’” (internal citation omitted)).
225. See Montana ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co., 365 P.2d at 514.
226. See, e.g., Montana ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 493, 499 (1995) (finding
the policy favoring plaintiff’s choice of forum “highly persuasive, . . . even if that choice of forum
involves forum shopping”).
227. See, e.g., Barrett v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 390 P.3d 1031 (Or. 2017).
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suit against [Union Pacific] on causes on actions arising from dealings en-
tirely distinct from those activities.”231
Similar to the plaintiffs in Tyrrell, Barrett relied on Section 56 and
Miles v. Illinois Central Railway Company, to show that courts had “con-
sistently” upheld jurisdiction in FELA cases in states unrelated to the cause
of action, headquarters, or principal place of business of the railroad.232
Barrett argued that the courts had “consistently done so because of the ‘ex-
ceptional’ nature of interstate railroads.”233 Barrett viewed FELA cases as
falling into the category of “exceptional” cases that Daimler noted in its
footnote 19, and thus would give rise to general jurisdiction in a forum
other than a corporate defendant’s place of incorporation or principal place
of business.234
The Oregon Supreme Court found fault with Barrett’s argument be-
cause Section 56 “addresses venue and subject matter jurisdiction. It does
not address personal jurisdiction.”235 Moreover, the basis for Barrett’s as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations applied to all
corporations and did not survive the Daimler decision.236 Oregon continued
its analysis, which resembles the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in
BNSF, holding that the fact that a corporation does business within a state is
not sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction.237 Oregon noted that it
“accordingly reach[ed] a different conclusion from the Montana Supreme
Court, which relied on earlier ‘doing business’ cases in upholding general
jurisdiction over a railroad.”238 Thus, Oregon’s refusal to broadly interpret
Section 56 eliminated one vehicle of forum shopping for railroad plaintiffs
in that state.
D. Further Implications
Although Montana has not marched lockstep with other jurisdictions,
the BNSF decision limits how future courts can construe Section 56 and
likely limits the forum shopping possibilities for FELA plaintiffs in the fu-
231. Id. at 1033 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted)).
232. Barrett, 390 P.3d at 1037–38 (quoting Pl.-Adverse Party’s Answering Br., Barrett v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 2016 WL 6156509 at *32 (Or. Aug. 29, 2016) (No. S063914)).
233. Pl.-Adverse Party’s Answering Br., supra note 232 at *32. R
234. Barrett, 390 P.3d at 1038 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. ___, ___ n. 19, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n. 19 (2014).
235. Id. at 1038; contra Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co, 373 P.3d 1, 2, 7 (Mont. 2016) (“Montana Courts
have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under [Section 56]. . . . [Section 56] does not specify whether the
‘concurrent jurisdiction’ conferred upon the state and federal courts refers only to subject-matter juris-
diction or personal jurisdiction . . . .”).
236. Barrett, 390 P.3d at 1038.
237. Id. at 1039–40.
238. Id. at 1040 (citing Tyrrell, 372 P.3d at 7).
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ture. The controversy of forum shopping “implicates more than just select-
ing a courthouse; it is a dispute about how to determine when a particular
state government may demand obedience from a particular person.”239 This
case impacts injured plaintiffs and railroad defendants directly. Further, the
contention that Montana has jurisdiction over a railroad simply because it
does business within the state becomes more difficult to argue.
The BNSF decision limits where plaintiffs may bring a FELA case in
state courts. To comport with the due process analysis set forth in Daimler,
a plaintiff may file suit where the railroad is incorporated or headquar-
tered.240 Although Justice Sotomayor stated in her dissent that plaintiffs
will “be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with which they have no con-
tacts or connection,”241 plaintiffs may still sue where the injury occurred
under specific jurisdiction.242 As a result, plaintiffs still have at least three
places to file FELA claims under the BNSF decision.243 Further, although
only Perkins thus far has been held as the exceptional case to Daimler,244
FELA plaintiffs may still argue that FELA claims should also be excep-
tional cases. Thus, plaintiffs still have options, but those options must now
comport with defendants’ due process rights.
E. Unanswered Questions
After the United States Supreme Court overruled Montana’s decision
in Tyrrell, it became clear that Section 56 does not automatically grant
Montana district courts jurisdiction simply because the railroad does busi-
ness in Montana.245 Despite this clarity, railroads and plaintiffs face some
future uncertainty.
Respondents argued that BNSF consented to jurisdiction when it regis-
tered to do business in Montana and designated a Montana agent for service
239. Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L. REV.
377, 378 (1985).
240. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017).
241. Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
242. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (“Where a forum seeks to
assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this ‘fair
warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at the residents of
the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities”
(internal citations omitted)).
243. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1552 (general personal jurisdiction provides two
forums); Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 472 (specific personal jurisdiction provides one forum).
244. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952) (held as the “textbook”
exceptional case of general jurisdiction on the basis that the foreign defendant maintained an office in
Ohio, kept corporate files there, and oversaw the company’s activities from Ohio during a time of war);
see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014).
245. See BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1555–58.
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of process;246 the United States Supreme Court stated that since this issue
was not raised before the Montana Supreme Court it would not be ad-
dressed.247 However, numerous courts have addressed this issue, holding
that a corporation does not consent to a state’s jurisdiction when it registers
a business and appoints an agent in a state.248 The Second Circuit opined
that to equate business registration with consent to general jurisdiction
“would raise constitutional concerns prudently avoided absent a clearer
statement by the state legislature or the [state appellate court].”249 This in-
terpretation makes sense to some practitioners: “After all, because every
state has some sort of registration requirement, the practical result of equat-
ing registration with consent to [general] jurisdiction would be that a busi-
ness operating in a state would necessarily be subject to general jurisdiction
there.”250 While it is difficult to perceive that by declining to address this
issue, the United States Supreme Court adopted a theory that would render
the clear due-process analysis from Daimler “wholly meaningless,” no
well-defined ruling has been articulated.251  Although, the concept is diffi-
cult to perceive, future arguments are not yet resolved.
Since neither the Montana Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue, practitioners will likely continue to raise the issue of
consent to personal jurisdiction in FELA cases with no relation to Montana.
Until there is a definitive ruling on the consent theory, railroad defendants
run the risk of being haled into court on the presumption that they con-
sented to general jurisdiction with their business registration. On the other
hand, injured railroad employees may potentially argue to have FELA cases
heard in the venue and jurisdiction of their choice in Montana under the
exceptional standard noted in Diamler, regardless of ties to the state. Even
though the United States Supreme Court wrote a seemingly straightforward
opinion in BNSF Railroad Company v. Tyrrell, the issue of expanded juris-
diction shopping in actions against corporations is not settled.
246. Brief for Resp’ts, supra note 101, at *50. R
247. BNSF Ry. Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.
248. Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2015) (citing the following examples: Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sher-
ritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000); Wench Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179,
180–84 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277–78 (D. Md.
1981), aff’d 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Washoe, 1
P.3d 963, 965–68 (Nev. 2000); Byam v. National Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1965);
Washington Equip. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Concrete Placing Co., Inc. 931 P.2d 170, 172–73 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997)).
249. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 623 (2d. Cir. 2016).
250. Michael Manning, When Can an Employer Be Sued in Montana? 22 MONT. EMP’T LAW LET-
TER 6 (July 2017).
251. See id. at 6.
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Yellowstone County, Montana has already addressed the issue and
provided a possible trend for future decisions. Relying on the Montana Su-
preme Court’s order remanding the consolidated cases in Tyrrell, BNSF
moved to dismiss cases unrelated to Montana on the basis that Yellowstone
County lacks jurisdiction.252 In response, the plaintiffs contended that
BNSF is not the “final word on jurisdiction,” because the case did not spe-
cifically address consent to jurisdiction.253 Plaintiffs requested jurisdictional
discovery based on two theories: 1) BNSF consented to personal jurisdic-
tion in Montana when it registered to conduct, and conducted, business in
Montana; and 2) equitable arguments that BNSF should be estopped from
contesting jurisdiction.254 Judge Russell Fagg denied plaintiffs’ requests for
jurisdictional discovery and granted BNSF’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction in at least three cases.255 The orders concluded that
asserting registration-based jurisdiction over BNSF would violate due pro-
cess, and BNSF’s due process rights trump the equitable argument
presented by the plaintiffs.256
Although some courts have interpreted their registration statutes as
conferring jurisdiction over a corporate defendant,257 Montana has not yet
considered this issue.258 Some practitioners have predicted that registration-
based jurisdiction is “‘ripe for invalidation by the Supreme Court’” because
252. See Mot. to Lift Stay, Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and Declare Prior Orders Void,
DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., *1–2 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Aug. 14, 2017) (No. DV 13-0729).
253. Pl.’s Resp. to BNSF’s Mot. to Lift Stay and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Mot.
for Jurisdictional Discovery, DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., *1–2 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Sept. 22, 2017)
(No. DV 13-0729) [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.].
254. Id. at *1–3.
255. Order and Dec., DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., *1 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. DV
13-0729); Order and Dec., Beck v. BNSF Ry. Co., *1 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. DV 14-
0167); Order and Dec., McNutt v. BNSF Ry. Co., *1 (Mont. 13th Jud. Dist. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. DV 14-
1089).
256. Order and Dec., DeLeon, supra note 255 at *5, *8; Order and Dec., Beck, supra note 255, at *5, R
*8; Order and Dec., McNutt, supra note 255, at *5, *8. R
257. See Monestier, supra note 248, at 1345 (citing the following examples: Bane v. Netlink, Inc., R
925 F.2d 637, 640–41 (3d Cir. 1991); Kowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199–2000
(8th Cir. 1990); Bohreer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 165 P.2d 186, 191–94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Sternberg v.
O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109–16 (Del. 1988); Confederation of Can. Life Ins. Co. v. Vega y Arminan,
144 So. 2d 805, 808–10 (Fla. 1962); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sklein, 422 S.E.2d 683, 864–65 (Ga. 1992);
Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 170–77 (Kan. 2006); Rykoff-Sexton v. American Ap-
praisal Assoc., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 89–91 (Minn. 1991); Read v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So.
2d 1229, 1230–31 (Miss. 1987); Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 574 A.2d 942, 943–45 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 272–74 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993); Augsbury Corp. v. Petrokey Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Simmers v.
American Cyanamid Corp., 576 A.2d 376, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Green Mountain Coll. v. Levine,
139 A.2d 822, 824–25 (Vt. 1958)).
258. Two Yellowstone County cases have been appealed to the Montana Supreme Court but have
not yet been briefed. See Notice of Appeal, DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co. (Mont. Oct. 23, 2017) (No. DA
17-0627); Notice of Appeal, Beck v. BNSF Ry. Co. (Mont. Oct. 23, 2017) (No. DA 17-0634).
29
McCarty: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 30 22-FEB-18 11:39
174 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 79
it is unconstitutional.259 Moreover, Goodyear, Daimler—and now BNSF—
“sound the death knell for doing business as a basis for general jurisdic-
tion.”260 Therefore, while plaintiffs may continue to argue that consent-
based jurisdiction allows them to bring unrelated cases in Montana, Yellow-
stone County shows a possible trend that Montana will follow until the
Supreme Court likely invalidates registration-based jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
In the words of Justice McKinnon, “A defendant does not forfeit lib-
erty or have a diminished liberty interest merely because the plaintiff brings
a FELA action. Nor does a defendant forfeit constitutional protection by
operating a railroad.”261 The Fourteenth Amendment due process constraint
applies to all state-court assertions of general jurisdiction; “the constraint
does not vary with the type of claim asserted or business enterprise
sued.”262 Although Montana has historically construed FELA liberally to
favor injured plaintiffs and created opportunities for railroad employees to
forum shop in Montana, the decision in BNSF diminished forum shopping
opportunities for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may still bring a FELA claim in at
least three jurisdictions, while allowing for the due process rights of the
railroad to be upheld. While BNSF did leave one critical question unan-
swered, it serves as a pivotal case lessening the chance of forum shopping
in Montana just by filing a FELA claim.
259. Monestier, supra note 248, at 1346 (quoting Charles W. “Rocky” Rhoades, Nineteenth Century R
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 444 (2012).
260. Monestier, supra note 248, at 1357–58. R
261. Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 373 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2016) (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
262. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559–59 (2017).
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